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ABSTRACT: Due to the scarcity of reflection on time as an independent sub-
ject in the Hebrew Bible, there has been a scholarly tendency to consider bib-
lical time conception more limited than our own—perhaps even non-existent. 
This article confronts the scholarly skepticism regarding the ability of the bib-
lical authors to think about time, defending the presence of time conceptualiza-
tion in the Hebrew Bible. In the article I discuss central research contributions 
to the subject of biblical time, in particular Sacha Stern’s thesis that the concept 
of time is entirely absent from the Hebrew Bible and from ancient Judaism 
more widely. I explore linguistic and anthropological assumptions which un-
derpin large parts of the discussion on time within biblical studies, arguing that 
one cannot assume on the basis of either that the biblical authors lacked a con-
cept of time. Finally, I suggest that the ability of the biblical writers to coordi-
nate unrelated processes according to a temporal axis is a strong argument in 
favour of their awareness of time. 
 
Key words: biblical time-conception, time-anthropology, linguistic rel-
ativism, time and process 
 
Introduction  
Quoting Augustine’s exasperated attempt to put into words the human experi-
ence of time is an almost irresistible temptation. Every academic working on 
time seems to do it. Augustine writes in his Confessions: 
“What, then, is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks 
me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled.”1  
Perhaps its very resistance makes the concept of time all the more fascinating 
as a subject of reflection: how can something which seems so fundamental to 
                                                                 
1. Yes, I fell for it too. Augustine, Confessions 11.14.17. Translated by R. S. Pine-
Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961). 
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our life-experience be this difficult to engage with? In the specific context of 
the Hebrew Bible there is, I think, a related reason why some academic inter-
preters have found time such an attractive subject of study: on the one hand, 
temporal notions and thinking on time appear vital to the constructions of the-
ology taking place within its pages.2 There is a rich vocabulary of temporal 
terms in the Hebrew Bible,3 and a wide range of themes related to time stand 
centrally throughout most of this literary corpus. On the other hand, there is 
virtually no discussion of time as a subject of reflection in its own right. Schol-
ars have pointed out that the temporal expressions which do occur frequently 
seem very concrete: they appear to describe time especially as it is character-
ized by particular activities or experiences.4 Time-talk is always difficult, but 
the biblical near-absence of reflection on time as an independent subject raises 
additional questions: to what extent does the textual material enable us to dis-
cuss how the biblical authors conceptualized time? Can we even be sure that it 
is really time which they discuss when time-related issues such as mortality, 
calendar, and history take to the stage?  
There has been a tendency in scholarship to consider biblical time concep-
tion not just different from our own, but also more limited—or perhaps even 
non-existent. In this article I hope to show that this skepticism regarding the 
ability of the Hebrew Bible authors to conceptualize time, which persists in 
some recent research contributions, is not warranted. After outlining some im-
portant research contributions to the subject of biblical time, I evaluate the lin-
guistic and anthropological assumptions which underpin significant parts of 
the current scholarly conversation on this subject.5 Finally, I suggest a few al-
ternative routes into the biblical material on time. 
                                                                 
2. For example, Genesis 1,14-15 ties the creation of sun and moon to the establishment 
of calendar and time-reckoning. At the end of the Yahwist’s flood story, God reiterates 
his promise that the seasons of the world shall remain predictable and stable (Genesis 
8,22). Isaiah 42,9 and 43,18 connect the human and the divine history in tantalizingly  
vague references to the former works of the deity and the new things now decreed. The 
Psalms too offer a wide range of reflections on temporal matters —especially those 
related to mortality, and to the different temporal realities of God and human being 
(see for example Ps. 39,5-6 and Ps 90,4). Finally, the wisdom literature goes further 
than any other genre in the Hebrew Bible in discussing, quite explicitly, the temporal 
organization of the world, as well as the human experience of life within these temporal 
structures (see for example Qohelet 1,4-11; 3,1-11.14-15, and 7,13-14). 
3. These terms are the focus of Gershon Brin’s detailed monograph on time in the 
Hebrew Bible and at Qumran. (Gershon Brin, The Concept of Time in the Bible and 
the Dead Sea Scrolls [Leiden: Brill, 2001]). 
4. So for example John Marsh, The Fulness of Time (London: Nisbet & Co., 1952), 
especially pp. 19-34.  E. Trocmé in J. J. von Allmen (ed), Vocabulary of the Bible 
(Lutterworth Press: London, 1958), pp. 423-426, and Henry Wheeler Robinson, Inspi-
ration and Revelation in the Old Testament  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), espe-
cially pp. 106-112. 
5. Within the confines of the article format, it is unfortunately not possible to survey 
all scholarly approaches to the subject of time in the Hebrew Bible. I have focused on 
research contributions which—because of their centrality to the scholarly conversation 
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A Biblical Concept of Time? 
The research field of biblical time conception blossomed especially in the fif-
ties and sixties, and it is currently experiencing a reawakening.6 While promi-
nent scholars in the middle of the twentieth century discussed especially the 
possibility that the Hebrew Bible writers had a different, and possibly more 
limited, conception of time than we do in the Western world today, some of 
the more recent research contributions raise the bar even higher. Perhaps most 
radically, Sacha Stern argues that the biblical authors were not in possession 
of a functional concept of time at all.7 Stern’s work will be the main focus of 
this article, as it poses an enormous challenge to explorations of biblical time 
conception. Initially, however, I turn to the lexical approach of the mid-twen-
tieth century. This was the first big wave of research into biblical time, and 
although it has largely been abandoned it forms an important backdrop to the 
more recent engagements with the subject of time in the Bible. 
Proponents of the lexical approach expected the lay-out of the Hebrew lan-
guage, especially its lexical stock, to reveal how the biblical authors conceptu-
alized certain notions, such as time. They would argue that the time-conception 
of the biblical writers was reflected in and perhaps even predicated on their 
language. According to this line of thinking, there was a particular Hebrew 
conception of time which a careful investigation of the Hebrew lexical stock 
would allow us to discover. Thus, for example, John Marsh suggested that 
there was a difference between ancient Hebrew and Greek thinking on time, 
                                                                 
on the topic and because of their use of related methodological approaches —can easily 
be brought into conversation with each other. I seek primarily to address a sometimes -
present scholarly skepticism regarding the presence and extent of time conception in 
the Hebrew Bible and consequently also our ability to engage with the concept of time 
as it manifests in the Bible. 
6. Especially worth mentioning are the recent monographs on time in the Hebrew Bible 
and the wider ancient Jewish context by Brin (The Concept of Time) and Sacha Stern 
(Time and Process in Ancient Judaism [Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civiliza-
tion, 2003]). Studies on time in individual books have also started appearing, for ex-
ample Mette Bundvad on Qohelet (Time in the Book of Qohelet [Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming]). Finally, a number of shorter studies on particular aspects of tem-
poral thinking in various, biblical contexts show the potential diversity of the subject 
area (for example Peter Machinist on fate and occurrence (Peter Machinist, “Fate, mi-
qreh, and Reason: Some Reflections on Qohelet and Biblical Thought ,” in Z. Zevit, S. 
Gitin, and M. Sokoloff (eds), Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic, 
and Semitic Studies in Honor of Jonas C. Greenfield  [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 
2005], pp. 159-175.) and Mattias Köchert on time and eternity in Psalm 90 (Mattias 
Köchert, “Zeit und Ewigkeit in Psalm 90,” in R. G. Kratz and H. Spieckermann (eds), 
Zeit und Ewigkeit als Raum göttlichen Handelns: Religionsgeschichtliche, theolo-
gische und philosophische Perspektiven [BZAW, 390; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
2009], pp. 155-185). 
7. Stern, Time and Process. 
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related directly to the words for time which were available in the two lan-
guages.8 Similarly, Oscar Cullmann argued in favour of a distinction between 
the Greek conception of time, which understood time as an eternal cycle, and 
the biblical understanding of time as an upwards-sloping line.9  
In Biblical Words for Time James Barr launched a comprehensive critique 
of the lexical approach.10 His attack was two-pronged: firstly, he questioned 
the accuracy of the distinctions assumed between the thinking on time within 
different language groups. For example, he pointed out the presence of cyclical 
time-conception in Hebrew, as well as linear views on time in Greek material.11 
                                                                 
8. Marsh, The Fulness of Time, p. 20. Marsh argues that biblical time is “realistic time”: 
time distinguished by its content rather than its chronological position. He argues that  
χρόνος  in the New Testament corresponds to chronological time and καιρός  to realistic 
time, καιρός being the appropriate translation of the Hebrew תע. A much more recent 
piece of research by Tilmann Zimmer (Zwischen Tod und Lebensglück. Eine Unter-
suchung zur Anthropologie Kohelets [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999]) champions a 
similar view of Hebrew time conception as predominately concrete, see especially p. 
82.  
9. Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time (London: SCM Press, 1962), p. 52. In a somewhat 
related manner, Jürgen Ebach draws attention to the fact that the Hebrew words for 
past can also mean “face” or “front” (םינפ, esp. in connection with the preposition ְ  ל as 
well as םדק), while the Hebrew word for future can mean “back-side” or “behind” 
( אחתיר / אחןור ) (see: Jürgen Ebach, Ursprung und Ziel: Erinnerte Zukunft und erhoffte 
Vergangenheit. Biblische Exegesen, Reflexionen, Geschichten [Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirschener Verlag, 1986], pp. 51-53). This lexical feature allegedly demonstrates 
that the past was conceived by the Hebrews as that which lies in front of us, accessible 
and visible. In connection with this particular claim, it is important to note that this 
distribution (future/behind—past/front) is far from unique to Hebrew, rendering it un-
likely at least that a particularly Hebrew conception of past and future could be dis-
covered on the basis of these words and their lexical potential. For example, in Latin  
anterior can be used both temporally and about that which is in front of or before 
something, and posterior similarly both temporally and about that which is behind. 
Hans Walter Wolff notes that something similar may be true in German regarding the 
words Vorfahren and Nachfahren. (Hans Walter Wolff, Anthropologie des Alten Tes-
taments. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1977, p. 135) Wolff makes a more moderate 
suggestion, which is not dependent on the lexical features of Hebrew in comparison 
with other languages, as he argues that the book of Deuteronomy specifically negoti-
ates questions of time and history by depicting the past as the dimension of time to-
wards which the human being must be orientated in order to live in accordance with 
the covenant (pp. 132-135). I find it rather wonderful that Wolff’s analysis does not 
make any sweeping claims about biblical time conception as a whole, focusing instead 
explicitly on the strategy and priorities in Deuteronomy’s use of time as a theological 
theme. 
10. Barr, Biblical Words for Time (London: SCM Press, 1962). 
11. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, p. 141. Similarly, Marc Brettler argues that cyclical 
thinking dominates in a number of Hebrew Bible contexts. (Marc Brettler, “Cyclical 
and Teleological Time in the Hebrew Bible,” in R.M. Rosen (ed), Time and Tempo-
rality in the Ancient World [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Ar-
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Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, he showed that the underlying meth-
odology of the lexical approach was not sound. Barr argued convincingly that 
it is rare to find a connection between the development of a language’s lexical 
stock and specific notions in the philosophical system of those who speak the 
language.12 There is no easy correspondence between a lexical stock and the 
mindset of the language-speakers. Thus, for example, even if תע means some-
thing slightly different from χρόνος and καιρός, we cannot assume a corre-
sponding difference between the way that Hebrew and Greek language-speak-
ers were able to think about time.  
As a result of Barr’s critical work, the field of biblical time conception was 
all but abandoned. 13  It is only quite recently that scholars have once again 
started to engage in detail with this question. This brings us to Stern’s 2003-
monograph on time and process in ancient Judaism. Stern does not assume the 
existence of a particular Hebrew understanding of time, which can be con-
trasted in some way to Greek or modern notions of time. Rather, he argues that 
the concept of time is entirely absent in the ancient Jewish material. It would 
have been impossible for the Hebrew Bible writers to discuss time as a subject 
in its own right, as they had no awareness of what “time” was.14 Stern’s work 
poses an enormous challenge to explorations of biblical time conception, and 
it deserves to be discussed in detail.15  
Fundamentally, Stern argues that neither the Hebrew Bible nor ancient Ju-
daism more generally operated with a concept of time. His basic thesis is that 
“the concept of time as an entity in itself was unknown in ancient Jewish cul-
ture.” Instead, “reality was experienced only in terms of processes.”16 These 
would include the processes of observable, natural phenomena, as well as the 
many concrete processes of the human every-day life. 
Process-thinking entails an engagement with reality “in empirical terms, as 
consisting of a multitude of discrete and concrete phenomena—activities, mo-
                                                                 
chaeology and Anthropology, 2004], pp. 111-128. See esp. pp. 113-118.) See also Ar-
naldo Momigliano, “History and the Concept of Time.” History and Theory 6. Beiheft 
6, 1966, p. 8. 
12. Barr, Biblical Words for Time, p. 116. 
13. John R. Wilch was one of very few researchers to attempt a (language-based) anal-
ysis of biblical time-conception in the immediate wake of Biblical Words for Time. 
(J.R. Wilch, Time and Event: an Exegetical Study of the Use of ‘et in the Old Testament 
in Comparison to Other Temporal Expressions in Clarification of the Concept of Time  
[Leiden: Brill, 1969]). 
14. Stern, Time and Process, especially pp. 107-112.  
15. Stern’s focus is on the broader context of ancient Judaism, but he considers the 
situation in the Hebrew Bible to be the same as in the ancient Jewish material more 
widely and dedicates most of a chapter to the thinking on time—or lack thereof—in 
the biblical material. 
16. Stern, Time and Process, p. 3. 
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tions, changes, and events—occurring simultaneously or in sequence, i.e. pro-
cesses.”17 Discrete is an important word here: Stern does not imagine a cohe-
sive system, in which the abstract term “process” simply replaces that of time. 
Instead, he argues, the authors of the ancient Jewish material would have con-
ceived reality as a number of separate and concrete processes which could be 
coordinated when necessary.18 Examples of such processes may include the 
movement of the moon and the sun over the sky in the course of a month or a 
day, the process of sowing and harvesting, or the period of a woman’s preg-
nancy. These are all concrete and real processes, according to which one may 
coordinate and plan activity, and Stern argues that they require no notion of 
time to function in this manner.  
Stern considers the concept of time to be a cultural construct. This allows 
him to argue that it “need not be shared by all cultures of mankind. Indeed, 
there is no reason to assume the existence of this concept in any given culture 
unless there is positive evidence to support it.”19 In ancient Judaism, Stern ar-
gues, there is no such evidence available. He builds a significant part of his 
case on the absence of discussion on time as a subject in its own right in the 
ancient Jewish material,20 as well as the lack in ancient Hebrew of a term to 
describe time as a whole.21  
Not only do the ancient Jewish sources refrain from discussing time explic-
itly; according to Stern, it is not even sensible to presume the presence of an 
implicit notion of time in this material. While, for example, the rabbinic writ-
ings care greatly for issues related to timing, calendar, and chronology, such 
interests are fully reconcilable with a process-orientated world-view. The pro-
cesses referred to in this material are all concrete and tied either to the human 
or natural world. They do not depend on an abstract concept of time.22 If the 
ancient Jewish interest in timing or time-keeping focuses only on concrete pro-
cesses, Stern argues, it is not warranted to read into the material an implicit 
interest in “the underlying, synthetic abstraction which we call ‘time’ or ‘time-
dimension’.”23   
There are two enormously productive notions in Stern’s work. Firstly, he 
warns against importing modern-day notions of time into a corpus of ancient 
                                                                 
17. Stern, Time and Process, p. 3. 
18. Stern, Time and Process, p. 3. 
19. Stern, Time and Process, p. 5. 
20. He argues that the absence of discussion on time is not due to the genres used by 
the ancient Jewish authors. He notes further the absence of discussion of time in con-
texts where such discussion, according to his reading of the sources, would have been 
reasonable, such as in Rabbinic exegetical comments on Psalm 90,4; Job 9,25-6, or the 
Shema (Deut 6,4). (Stern, Time and Process, p. 31.) 
21. He argues that ןמז, which comes to mean “time” in medieval material carries the 
meaning only of “point in time” in the ancient Jewish material. (Stern, Time and Pro-
cess., pp. 26-30.) 
22. Stern, Time and Process, especially pp. 48-57 and pp. 59-69. 
23. Stern, Time and Process, p. 4. 
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material.24 It is extremely tempting to consider our concepts and notions uni-
versal, simply because it is how we are used to think. Stern sensibly demands 
that a detailed analysis of the ancient texts back up our discussion of their use 
of concepts such as time. Secondly, Stern’s analysis of the literary choices 
made by the ancient Jewish writers, as well as by the writers of the Hebrew 
Bible specifically, offers an extremely useful insight into the linguistic and 
topical strategies which were used to explore temporality within a particular 
ancient context. The centrality in this exploration of natural processes and met-
aphors taken from the daily life of human beings is particularly interesting. 
Nonetheless, Stern has not persuaded me that the concept of time was ab-
sent from the Hebrew Bible, and from ancient Judaism more widely.25 His ar-
gument regarding this absence of time moves on a number of levels, and in 
order to evaluate his basic thesis it is necessary to separate them out from each 
other. I want to look more closely at two of Stern’s main approaches: firstly, 
he makes use of a linguistic-literary approach. He examines the Hebrew terms 
used to express issues which we consider temporal and debates the meaning of 
these terms. He discusses the use of certain expressions and metaphors, and he 
looks at the literary contexts in which (what seems to us to be) temporal con-
cerns occur in order to investigate the scope of the claims made about, for ex-
ample, calendar and history. Secondly, he builds on a number of anthropolog-
ical studies of so-called “primitive” societies, in which anthropologists have 
found the concept of time to be lacking or pre-operational in character.26 This 
second methodological approach is particularly important to Stern’s claim that 
                                                                 
24. Stern, Time and Process, pp. 5-6. 
25. Stern’s general thesis has not tended to sway his academic reviewers either. Nich-
olas R.M. de Lange considers two parts of Stern’s argument particularly unconvincing:  
“To accept Stern’s conclusion it is necessary first to agree with him both that there is 
no trace of the Greek concept of time in the rabbinic writings and that it is legitimate 
to use ‘the Jews’ as a synonym of ‘the Rabbis’.” (p. 632) For example, he notes the 
circularity of thought when Stern excludes from the category of “Jews” those Jews  
who used concepts of time unproblematically. Catherine Hezner is more sympathetic 
towards Stern’s work—especially his discussion of rabbinic literature specifically—
but she takes issue with the very general nature of his argument: like de Lange she 
argues that Rabbinic literature cannot be seen as representative of ancient Judaism as 
a whole. Diane Lipton approaches Stern’s argument from a more philosophical per-
spective, casting doubt on the claim that there can be process without time, even if 
there could conceivably be time without process (p. 103). She furthermore discusses a 
number of biblical passages, arguing in favour of the presence in these texts of thinking 
on time. See: Nicholas R.M. de Lange, Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2 
(2005), pp. 628-633, Catherine Hezner, Journal of Jewish Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2 
(2005), and Diane Lipton, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Uni-
versity of London, Vol. 68, No. 1 (2005), pp. 103-104. 
26. The two approaches are not unrelated. Several of the anthropologists referred to by 
Stern make use of linguistic evidence themselves when evaluating the conception of 
time in specific, primitive-society contexts. For example, Christopher R. Hallpike, The 
Foundations of Primitive Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), refers repeatedly 
to Whorf’s work on linguistic relativism, see for instance p. 346 and p. 357. 
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the concept of time is not universal and that a society is able to function without 
knowing it. Taking my starting point in Stern’s use of these two disciplines, I 
will consider how each of them may be applied to a discussion of biblical time. 
A Rose by Any Other Name: the Impact of Language upon Thinking 
Stern argues that if time were really present as a concept in the ancient Jewish 
material, it would have been discussed in some form or other. As such, his is 
very much an argument from silence:  
“The concept of time (in a general sense) is so fundamental to our modern per-
ception of reality that if the rabbis had shared it, one would expect them to have 
referred to it, just as we do frequently in our daily speech. Its absence in early 
rabbinic discourse (…) calls for an explanation.”27  
Seeking to demonstrate the non-presence of time in the ancient Jewish mate-
rial, Stern discusses words which seem to describe time, as well as passages 
which appear to discuss temporality, arguing that it is in fact not time as such 
which is in view here. Rather, the word that later comes to mean “time”  (ןמז) 
refers in the ancient Jewish texts only to points in time and periods.28 Similarly, 
Stern argues, apparent discussions of temporal matters within the context of 
ancient Judaism are confined to depictions of concrete processes, points in 
time, and specific periods in time.  
If discussions of points in time and specific periods do not indicate the pres-
ence of the concept of time, what, then, does Stern expect this concept to look 
like? Interestingly, he defines it quite narrowly:  
“Time is only an abstract measurement of processes: it is, primarily, a way of 
expressing how long a process is. The modern concept of time as a general 
category, an autonomous flow, an empty extension, or a structure and dimen-
sion of the universe, is only a generalization and synthesis of all the discrete 
                                                                 
27. Stern, Time and Process, p. 30. Differently than Stern, I would argue that genre 
conventions have to be taken into account here. The early rabbinic sources are, in 
Stern’s own words, “devoid of philosophical discourse or scientific speculation.” 
However, Stern argues, an appeal to genre in this case is unsound, because “it is per-
fectly possible for people who are neither philosophers nor scientists to discuss and 
make statements about the nature of time.” (Stern , Time and Process, p. 30.) As a 
demonstration of this, Stern refers to the habitual references to time in every-day con-
versations today (pp. 30-31). However, there is a difference between it being possible 
to discuss time and it being necessary.  
28. Stern, Time and Process, p. 29: “zeman is not a self-standing or ‘pure’ entity, a  
universal dimension, a flow, or a continuum. The concept of zeman, embracing only 
points in time and finite periods, is that of the ‘time of things’ (…) zeman is the meas-
urement of the occurrence and length of processes, natural events, and human activi-
ties .” In the Hebrew Bible, a number of additional terms are used to refer to time. Stern 
discusses a few of these and argues these terms (תישׁרב and םלוע) are process-linked 
too, see pp. 108-112. 
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time-measurements that can be made of the individual processes which we em-
pirically experience. (…) Inasmuch as we tend to treat it, in modern culture, as 
existing and real (…) time often becomes a reified abstraction.”29 
The definition of time as a reified abstraction (an abstraction which is treated 
as if it were real) raises a number of questions—primarily whether it is neces-
sary to conclude that there is no concept of time in the Hebrew Bible if its texts 
do not treat time specifically as a “reified abstraction.” Of course, if one re-
serves the term “time” for this particular way of conceptualizing temporal cat-
egories, it ceases to work as a description of what is happening in the biblical 
texts when they discuss, in other ways, issues relating to history, chronology, 
calendar, temporal order in creation, human temporality and so on.30 But why 
should this particular definition of time be privileged to the exclusion of all 
other ways of negotiating temporality? I wonder whether Stern’s analysis here 
ends up doing exactly what it aims to avoid, namely imposing a modern cate-
gory upon the ancient material. Based on our engagement with time today, he 
has chosen one particular definition of the concept of time. He then imports 
this concept to the ancient texts, evaluating them on the basis of their failure to 
engage with temporal themes as one would understand them within this spe-
cific modern framework.  
If Stern is right that the ancient Jewish sources and the Hebrew Bible do 
not treat time as a reified abstraction, what he has shown is simply that this 
particular way of conceptualizing and engaging with time is not present in the 
material. He has not demonstrated that the ancient Jewish writers were una-
ware of time and unable to discuss the temporal dimensions of, for example, 
history, creation, and calendar. Might his discussion of the lexicon and gram-
matical structure of Hebrew serve him better? 
Stern dedicates quite a lot of attention to the discussion of the “real” mean-
ing of time-words like ןמז. Thus for example, he shows that there is no word 
for time as a general notion in biblical and rabbinic Hebrew.31 He also dis-
cusses grammatical constructions in Hebrew, and though he states that the 
grammatical set-up of a language does not determine thinking, he nonetheless 
                                                                 
29. Stern, Time and Process, p. 18. 
30. Ralph M. Rosen’s comments on time conception in ancient cultures are relevant  
here. He states that “there is no reason to suppose that we can legitimately articulate a 
comprehensive, monolithic pre-modern or ancient conception of time and temporal-
ity.” (p. 3) (Ralph M. Rosen, “Ancient Time across Time,” in R.M. Rosen (ed), Time 
and Temporality in the Ancient World [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Mu-
seum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2004], pp. 1-9.) Instead, he argues, p. 2, that 
both ancient and modern cultures evidence a number of ways of conceptualizing time: 
“the very notion of existence implies some sense of time, whether it is a static time, 
time that flows in one direction like a river or that moves like a continuous circle; time 
that implies endless futurity or an ever-growing past.” 
31. I concede this quite happily. At the very least, there are no words in biblical Hebrew 
which always and unequivocally refer to time as a general concept. As Barr noted, 
however, it is difficult to think of a word in any language which does this. (Barr, Bib-
lical Words for Time, p. 97.) 
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maintains that the preference for aspect over tense in Hebrew may reveal some-
thing about the thinking of the language speakers.32 To some extent, then, Stern 
presupposes that there is a correlation between language and thinking, so that 
the former reveals the latter. As discussed above, the proponents of the lexical 
approach would argue in favour of a similar correspondence between a lan-
guage and the conceptual structures of the language-speaker. Stern does not, 
however, return to this approach. He is not only—and not even primarily—
interested in the lexical stock of Hebrew. Nonetheless, both approaches rely in 
part on the brand of linguistics known as linguistic relativism. 
A particularly famous product of linguistic relativism is Benjamin Lee 
Whorf’s discussion of the Amerindian language Hopi and its expression of 
temporal concepts. Whorf argued that the peculiar character of Hopi depictions 
of time, especially the limited temporal vocabulary, shaped and affected ad-
versely the Hopi-speakers’ ability to conceptualize time.33 As a result Hopi 
language speakers have “no general notion or intuition of TIME as a smooth 
flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal 
rate...”34A Whorfian approach to the Hebrew Bible would explore the temporal 
vocabulary, and the ways in which time is grammaticalized in Hebrew, in order 
to gain insight into the capacity of the language-speakers to think about time. 
If, for example, biblical Hebrew lacks a term to describe time abstractly, it 
would be reasonable to assume that this would adversely affect the biblical 
writers’ ability to think about time abstractly. If there is no real tense system 
in Hebrew, this too would reveal something about their understanding of 
time.35 
Stern distances himself from what he terms “lexical determinism,”36 but 
nonetheless he expects the Hebrew language to reflect the conceptual struc-
tures among the language-speakers. On the one hand, he acknowledges that 
even if Hebrew lacks a general word for time, this “should not have prevented 
                                                                 
32. Stern, Time and Process, p. 24: “preference for aspect and modality in the verb-
system of a language (…) may suggest that aspect of event and modality of statement 
are conceptually more important, to the language-users, than time of event.” And fur-
ther p. 25: “The fuzziness or absence of a tense system in many languages may thus 
serve to confirm that the concept of a temporal dimension is not necessary for a cogent 
experience and interpretation of lived reality.” 
33. According to Benjamin Lee Whorf, Hopi language contains “no words, grammat-
ical forms, constructions or expressions that refer directly to what we call ‘time,’ or to 
past, present, or future…” (Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality: 
Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Edited and with an introduction by J. B. 
Carroll [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956], p. 57.)  
34. Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality, p. 57. 
35. See also Guy Deutscher, Through the Language Glass: Why the World Looks Dif-
ferent in Other Languages (London: Arrow, 2011), p. 144: “One idea has proved par-
ticularly resilient to the onslaught of fact or reason: the argument that the tense system 
of a language determines the speakers’ understanding of time. Biblical Hebrew has 
offered particularly rich picking” due to its “allegedly tenseless verbal system.” 
36. Stern, Time and Process, p. 13. 
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the rabbis or others from conceptualizing this notion, or from giving it some 
form of verbal or other expression.”37 On the other hand, he considers the fact 
that they did not do this to be of great importance. If the notion of time in 
general is never described in the ancient Jewish material, Stern argues, this 
indicates that they did not need the concept. At a glance, this argument differs 
significantly from that of Whorf, but perhaps the two modes of thinking about 
the relationship between language and time are not as unrelated as it would 
initially seem. While Whorf argued that language determines thinking, Stern 
argues that language reveals thinking: to Stern it remains significant that ןמז 
does not mean “time” exactly, and that no other expression was devised by the 
ancient Jews which carried this particular meaning. There is a degree of lin-
guistic relativism in this argument too, though it is not as extreme a proposition 
as Whorf’s. Stern’s approach to the Hebrew language remains dependent upon 
the notion that we can expect a relationship between the lexicon and grammar 
of a language and the mindset of the language-speakers, and in such a way that 
the former tells us something about the latter.  
Whorf’s approach has been viciously attacked within linguistics. His con-
crete case studies have been refuted,38 and the linguistic relativism, on which 
his work based itself, has lost much support. The oft-quoted statement by Ro-
man Jakobson is telling of the shift in opinion which has taken place within 
linguistic research: “Languages differ essentially in what they must convey and 
not in what they may convey.”39 Thus, in any given language there are things 
which must be communicated. At the same time, however, it is still possible to 
think and express things which must not necessarily be communicated in a 
given language. For example, I have to use the future tense if I want to discuss 
my plans for the coming year in French. At the same time, however, I am able 
to tell my Danish friends about my future plans too, despite the fact that Danish 
has no proper future tense. 
                                                                 
37. Stern, Time and Process, p. 30.  
38. Ekkehart Malotki, p. 632, states that: “the Hopi Indians lack neither an elaborate 
consciousness of time nor its reflection in their speech…” (Ekkehart Malotki, Hopi 
Time: a Linguistic Analysis of the Temporal Concepts in the Hopi  Language [Berlin 
and New York: Mouton Publisher, 1983]). Malotki also emphasizes, however, that the 
Hopi “sense of time, or the role that time plays in their lives and culture, does not 
correspond to ours. Nor would one expect the two to be identical. (…) although we 
detect a great deal of overlap, the influence of historical, social, religious, environmen-
tal, and other factors has definitely shaped, and is still shaping, the individual temporal 
needs of each group.” Malotki argues more generally, p. 630, that some domains of 
thinking “are experienced universally by all mankind (…) One such domain is time, a 
fundamental experience conceptualized by every human mind and processed linguis-
tically by all languages to some degree or other.” See also Alfred Gell, The Anthropol-
ogy of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images (Oxford and Dul-
les, VA: Berg, 1992), p. 127, and Steven Pinker, The Language Instinct: the New Sci-
ence of Language and Mind (London: Allen Lane, 1994), p. 63. 
39. Roman Jakobson, “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation ,” in Reuben A. Brower 
(ed), On Translation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 236. 
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It is perfectly valid to investigate which aspects of temporal experience 
must necessarily be conveyed in biblical Hebrew.40 What one cannot claim on 
the basis of a linguistic analysis, however, is the inability of the Hebrew Bible 
authors to conceptualize and discuss the notion of time. If language does not 
impact and reveal thinking in the way suggested by Whorf, Stern’s analysis of 
the “real” meaning of words that mean something like time does not tell us 
very much about the ability of the ancient Jewish writers to think about time. 
We cannot use linguistic evidence to challenge the conceptualizing capacity of 
the language speakers and thus disprove the presence of particular concepts 
among them.  
Turning now to anthropological studies of the engagement with time in 
“primitive” societies, I want to consider what this discipline can contribute to 
the discussion of time and cognition. 
Cultural Relativism and Thinking on Time 
Making use of ethnographic studies which question the presence of the concept 
of time in a number of specific, modern-day societies,41 Stern argues that a 
similar unawareness characterized ancient Judaism.42 In order to evaluate the 
validity of this claim, one question in particular must be asked; namely what 
kind of cultural relativism regarding time can be demonstrated through ethno-
graphic studies? That is, what can ethnography discover about the conception 
of time in a given society? And how far is it possible to use ethnographic stud-
ies to demonstrate divergences in the basic time-conception of different socie-
ties?  
According to Stern, “ethnographers have found that in many—if not all—
‘primitive’ or non-modern societies, the concept of time as an entity in itself 
simply does not exist.” The members of such societies do not operate with “the 
                                                                 
40. And even here it may be wise to remember, with Jacobson (“On Linguistic As-
pects ,” pp. 235-236) that: “the grammatical pattern of a language (as opposed to its 
lexical stock) determines those aspects of each expression that must be expressed in 
the given language.”  
41. The anthropologists referred to especially are Edwan Evan Evans -Pritchard, Pierre 
Bourdieu, and Christopher Hallpike. Christopher Hallpike (The Foundations of Prim-
itive Thought [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979]) does not exactly argue that there is no 
concept of time in pre-technological societies. Rather, he suggests, on the basis of psy-
cho-linguistics, that even adult members of these societies have only a pre-operational 
understanding of time. For a discussion of this claim and the psycho-linguistic studies 
on which Hallpike builds, see Gell, The Anthropology of Time, pp. 97-117. 
42. Stern, Time and Process, p. 7, states that he is “not using ethnographic material to 
suggest any particular affinity between ancient Judaism and the present -day societies 
ethnography describes. All I am suggesting is that they shared a similar view of time 
and process, not because this view is intrinsically primitive, but simply as an alterna-
tive to the modern Western world-view.”  
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notion of ‘pure time’ or an overarching ‘time-dimension’,” and they are unfa-
miliar with the “concepts of time-saving and time-management.”43  For exam-
ple, Stern refers to Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard who argues in the context of 
his work on the Nuer people that “the Nuer system of time-reckoning (…) is a 
series of conceptualizations of natural changes” in which “the selection of 
points of reference is determined by the significance which these natural 
changes have for human activities.”44  
This statement occurs in the course of Evans-Pritchard’s analysis of oeco-
logical time among the Nuer—a cyclical mode of time-reckoning, the length 
of which is a year’s worth of seasons. Evans-Pritchard argues that oecological 
time is tied to concrete processes—such as the phases in the daily work with 
the cattle, changes in vegetation, and so on.45 However, he goes on to discuss 
another type of time concept among the Nuer: structural time, which is de-
signed to deal with periods of time of a longer duration than a year. Stern does 
not refer to this second part of Evans-Pritchard’s study of Nuer time, which is 
unfortunate, since structural time is described as being much more abstract 
than oecological time.46 Structural time is counted and calculated according to 
“sets” of generations, each lasting approximately ten years, instead of accord-
ing to real, observable processes. To Evans-Pritchard, then, Nuer time reckon-
ing is not exclusively concrete, dependent only on concrete natural and human 
processes. Rather, larger stretches of time have to be worked out according to 
more abstract processes. 47  
During the course of his discussion, Evans-Pritchard remarks that, to the 
Nuer, “(t)ime has not the same value throughout the year. (…) In the drought 
the daily time-reckoning is more uniform and precise while lunar reckoning 
receives less attention…”48 As I read Evans-Pritchard, the implication is that 
the practical organization of time-measurement in Nuer-land changes with the 
seasons and their differing demands. This observation demonstrates well the 
way in which an ethnographic study may inform us about culturally specific 
ways of ordering and making sense of time. However, Evans-Pritchard’s state-
ment could possibly also be read in another sense; namely as an argument that, 
                                                                 
43. Stern, Time and Process, p. 12. 
44. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: a Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political 
Institutions of a Nilotic People (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1940), p. 104. (Also quoted by Stern, Time and Process, p. 14.) 
45. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, p. 96 and p. 102 
46. For example, Evans-Pritchard argues: “the movement of structural time is, in a 
sense, an illusion, for the structure remains fairly constant and the perception of time 
is no more than the movement of persons, often as groups, through the structure. Thus 
age-sets succeed one another for ever, but there are never more than six in existence 
and the relative positions occupied by these six sets at any time are fixed structural 
points through which actual sets of persons pass in endless succession.” (Evans -
Pritchard, The Nuer, p. 107.) 
47. In The Anthropology of Time, pp. 17-18, Gell also comments on the abstract char-
acter of Nuer structural time as described by Evans -Pritchard. 
48. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer, p. 103. 
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to the Nuer, time does in fact change character according to the phases of the 
year; that, according to the metaphysical logic of the Nuer, time in itself gen-
uinely functions differently in the drought-season than in other seasons. If this 
were the intended sense, that would be quite problematic. Alfred Gell’s dis-
cussion of the purview of time-anthropology shows why. 
While maintaining that different societies constitute their world in different 
ways, and that this cultural relativism includes their handling of time, Gell ar-
gues that it is mistaken  “to suppose that cultural systems of transmitted beliefs 
and representation are pervaded with a deep ‘cultural logic’, which sets the 
outmost limits on the ‘thinkable’, for members of a given culture.” Ethnogra-
phy is not “the kind of enterprise which could result in the discovery of new 
ways of constituting the world in its general or categorical aspects…”49 For 
example, it is a problematic claim that ritual is designed to make time actually 
go into reverse. Similarly, it would be a problem to say that to the Nuer-mind 
time actually passes differently during the drought-season because it is being 
handled differently in this period. 
I want to suggest that Stern’s claim about the absence of time in ancient 
Judaism overreaches in a similar way. He does not simply say that the ancient 
Jewish writers saw no cultural, ritual, or agricultural need to engage with time 
abstractly, or that the focus in the ancient Jewish material is on those concrete 
representations of temporal matters which were necessary to the purposes of 
the writers and their communities. Rather, he bases a claim about time in it-
self—namely, that it was absent as a conceptual category—on ethnographic 
studies of time-organization. By doing so, he enlists ethnography to make a 
case for which it is not well-equipped. As Gell states, the “limitations of eth-
nography as a descriptive genre” must be respected. The anthropologist should 
refrain from making “metaphysical statements.” Statements about the consti-
tution of the world or the “kind of place the world in general must considered 
to be” belong to the discipline of philosophy, not anthropology.50   
Anthropological studies uniquely enable us to examine the use of time-talk 
in relation to the social structures in a given society. The fact that people speak 
differently about time, organize their calendars differently, etc., demonstrates 
that different areas of concern are important and useful to the societal organi-
zation in different cultural contexts. It says nothing about what time actually is 
or is fundamentally perceived to be. 
The Temporal Coordination of Processes in the Hebrew Bible 
Is it possible to render likely the presence of temporal awareness in the Hebrew 
Bible, even if time is rarely discussed explicitly in this corpus? So far I have 
mainly discussed what cannot be claimed about (the absence of) time in the 
Hebrew Bible and ancient Judaism on the basis of linguistic and anthropolog-
ical work. At this point, however, I want to present an argument in favour of 
the biblical writers’ ability to make use of the notion of time. This argument is 
                                                                 
49. Gell, The Anthropology of Time, p. 55. 
50. Gell, The Anthropology of Time, p. 55. 
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not dependent on the biblical writers’ discussion of issues such as history, cal-
endar, creation, mortality, or eschatology. While I am convinced that the wide-
spread interest in issues related to these themes indicates the ability of the bib-
lical writers to conceptualise temporal ideas, Stern would assign such discus-
sion to the realm of process thinking. Differently, I hope that my argument in 
this section operates on premises that Stern and the anthropologists, on whose 
work he builds, may be able to accept. 
Gell argues that the “whole point” of the abstract category of time is “that 
it provides the means for the relative unification of otherwise diverse catego-
ries of processes.” We use the category of time to coordinate discrete pro-
cesses, some of which, aside from their position on some sort of temporal axis, 
are not obviously related: “Time (…) allows for the co-ordination of diverse 
processes; biological processes with social ones, psychological or subjective 
processes with objective, clock-timed ones, and so forth.”51 
It seems plausible to me that a successful coordination of different pro-
cesses in time indicates an understanding of the specifically temporal aspect of 
process. In other words, coordinating events according to a temporal axis re-
quires a concept of time. This is important because the authors of the Hebrew 
Bible constantly demonstrate the ability to coordinate processes in time. For 
example, the writer of Amos 1,1 conveys the simultaneity of a particular point 
in time during the reign of two kings of different dynasties with the year pre-
ceding “the earthquake” by two years. The synchronisms in the Books of Kings  
achieve something similar. Different processes, referring to different modes of 
organizing events along a time-line, are here coordinated. Such examples im-
ply that the Hebrew language users were well aware of the specifically tem-
poral aspect of process.52 
Another example of the ability to coordinate discrete processes in time can 
be found in Joshua 10,12-13. Here the narrator tells of a miracle: as Israel pre-
pares to fight the Amorites, God lets the sun stand still in the heaven. It does 
not set until Israel has won the battle.53 Two discrete processes are here coor-
dinated: the pace of the sun, which extraordinarily slows down, and the events 
                                                                 
51. Gell, The Anthropology of Time, p. 316. 
52. In her review of “Time and Process ,” Lipton too refers to a number of biblical texts  
in order to counter Stern’s claim that the ancient Jews did not possess a concept of 
time. Rather than turning to the intersection of process and time, however, she demon-
strates that there are in fact examples in the Hebrew Bible of time being discussed as 
something distinct from process. Specifically, she refers to the creation epic in Genesis 
1:1-2:4a: “Surely the sheer emptiness of God's seventh day of creation (as well as the 
recommended human imitation of it) highlights time as an entity distinct from event 
and process!” (p. 104) This strikes me as an entirely reasonable point. (Diane Lipton: 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London , Vol. 68, 
No. 1 (2005), pp. 103-104.) 
53. “On the day when the LORD gave the Amorites over to the Israelites, Joshua spoke 
to the LORD; and he said in the sight of Israel, “Sun, stand still at Gibeon, and Moon, 
in the valley of Aijalon.” And the sun stood still, and the moon stopped, until the  nation 
took vengeance on their enemies. Is this not written in the Book of Jashar? The sun 
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of the battle which would not have been able to take place within the normal 
hours of daytime. This particular example of temporal coordination parallels a 
real-life encounter between the anthropologist Gell and an Umeda man who 
seemed unable to grasp that walking faster would make it easier for him to get 
home before dark. In fact, Gell does not believe that the Umeda man was una-
ble to perform the necessary temporal coordination to work this out, but blames 
miscommunication for the strange situation.54 He notes, however, that another 
anthropologist, Christopher Hallpike, has used his account of this encounter as 
an example of a pre-operational understanding of time:55 understood within the 
context of pre-operational time-conception, the problem for the Umeda man 
would be that he is unable to coordinate two discrete processes temporally (that 
of walking a certain distance and that of the sun setting). 56  Conversely, as 
shown, biblical writers, including the author of Joshua 10:12-13, easily coor-
dinate seemingly unrelated processes according to their placement on a tem-
poral axis. 
Alternative Approaches to Time in the Hebrew Bible  
In this article I have shied away somewhat from grappling with the philosoph-
ical question of whether or not time is universal to the human experience. In-
stead, I have argued that the disciplines of linguistics and anthropology, 
through which the time-conception in the Hebrew Bible is frequently explored, 
are not very well-suited to answering this question. These disciplines do not 
allow us to conclude that time is absent in the Hebrew Bible or, indeed, ancient 
Judaism more widely. Regarding the Hebrew Bible specifically, I have sug-
gested that the effortless coordination in the biblical material of discrete pro-
cesses according to a temporal axis favours the conclusion that its writers did 
in fact possess an awareness of time.  
Thus, I am strongly in favour of retaining the category of time when engag-
ing with the biblical interest in calendar, history, mortality, creation, eschatol-
ogy and so forth. Both Stern and the proponents of the lexical approach have 
made some enormously interesting observations about the ways in which the 
biblical authors discuss these themes. As we have seen, Stern underlines in 
particular the centrality of process in the ancient Jewish and biblical material—
the use of specific natural processes, as well as processes taken from the daily 
life of human beings—to explore the temporal aspects of human life. Some-
what similarly, researchers such as Marsh and Wheeler Robinson pointed out 
that biblical depictions of time tend to tie temporal experience to concrete 
events, activities, and processes. Instead of dissuading us from approaching the 
                                                                 
stopped in midheaven, and did not hurry to set for about a whole day” (NRSV transla-
tion). 
54. Gell, The Anthropology of Time, pp. 113-116. 
55. Gell, The Anthropology of Time, p. 115, as well as p. 102, where he states: “Ac-
cording to Hallpike, the ability to abstract time as a computable aspect of all processes, 
in terms of duration, succession and simultaneity, is an aptitude not possessed by mem-
bers of pre-technological societies.” 
56. Gell, The Anthropology of Time, p. 115. 
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topic of biblical time, these observations encourage further engagement with 
the depictions of temporal themes in the biblical material.  
It is important to remember that the biblical writers, when seeking to engage 
with the difficult subject of time, do not only refer to concrete processes in a 
literal manner. Such processes are also used as images and metaphors. One 
example is Qohelet’s repeated use of the phrase “under the sun”:57 when the 
book’s author uses this phrase to describe human life, he uses the image of a 
single day and the sun’s daily journey across the sky to depict the temporal 
aspect of human life in its entirety. The frequent use of metaphorical depictions 
in the Hebrew Bible presents us with a fascinating access-point into the strate-
gies used by the biblical writers to engage with different aspects of temporal 
existence. It invites us to ask why, for example, the sun is such an appropriate 
temporal metaphor for the author of Qohelet. What may this image, taken from 
the world of concrete, natural phenomena, add to the depiction of time in this 
biblical book? 
Instead of claiming that the biblical writers could only think about time in 
terms of process or as something concrete, I would ask which priorities and 
concerns may have prompted them to choose a particular depiction of time. 
For example, how are the text-writers interested in time as something concrete? 
Which particular processes do they make use of to depict issues related to time, 
and what aspects of temporal experience do the chosen processes privilege? 
An exploration of preferred temporal expressions, metaphors, and ideas may 
help us see which parts of the human temporal experience it was pressing to 
discuss. We may also consider the extent to which cultural and ritual needs 
reinforce the popular modes of depicting time and temporality.  
I would also be interested in potential changes to the engagement with time 
over the course of the long period, during which the Hebrew Bible was written. 
It may be that new genres, such as, for example, apocalyptic vision, require 
new temporal images.58 Do the biblical writers innovate when they choose pro-
cesses as images to describe the experience of time? Could different depictions 
of time come into conflict with each other? For example, we are used to de-
scribe the conflict in second temple Judaism between the solar and lunar cal-
endars as indicative of differing theological interests. This is surely right, but 
might something additional be gained if we also consider the potential of each 
                                                                 
57. The expression accounts for 29 out of 35 references to the sun in the book of 
Qohelet. 
58. Especially interesting in this context are, I think, the discussions of time in the book 
of 1 Enoch—here a wide range of temporal themes take to the stage, both within the 
depictions of the visionary experience and in the overviews of history and cosmology 
offered in the Astrological Book, the Apocalypse of Weeks, and the Animal Apoca-
lypse. 1 Enoch evidences a diverse interest in temporal themes, which appear to have 
been used across the Enoch tradition to grapple with the community’s situation. (See 
for example George W. E. Nickelsburg, “‘Enoch’ as Scientist, Sage, and Prophet: Con-
tent, Function and Authorship in 1 Enoch,” in Society of Biblical Literature Seminar 
Papers, 38 [Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1999], pp. 203-230, and especially p. 218-
219.) 
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calendar—and the literary formulations and depictions of them both—to func-
tion as temporal metaphors?  
A final area of interest to me would be to examine what happens when the 
standard depictions of themes related to time prove insufficient. How do the 
Hebrew Bible authors approach more abstract notions of time, for example—
such as the differing temporal reality of God and human being, which is tackled 
poetically in Psalm 90? What linguistic strategies are used when time itself 
becomes an area of reflection and a need is felt to engage directly with the 
properties of this part of our existence? Here I want to use the book of Qohelet 
as an example once again, because it provides an excellent example of a He-
brew Bible attempt to engage abstractly with the concept of time. The author 
of this book considers at length the effects of the temporal order on humankind. 
He stretches traditional language regarding time to its breaking-point in order 
to consider not only the temporal reality, but also the human thinking on this 
reality.59 If researchers like Stern are looking for an explicit discussion of time 
in the Hebrew Bible, the book of Qohelet is an excellent place to go. It is, 
however, far from the only biblical engagement with temporal thinking. The 
stock images, the metaphorical application of concrete processes, and the 
genre-dependent depictions of temporal experience equally deserve to be dis-
cussed under the heading of time. 
                                                                 
59. For a detailed discussion, see Machinist’s brilliant article on the language of fate 
and time in the book of Qohelet: “Fate, miqreh, and Reason,” as well Mary Mill’s  
discussion of time in her monograph on Qohelet and autobiography (Mary E. Mills: 
Reading Ecclesiastes: A Literary and Cultural Exegesis. (Heythrop Studies in 
Comtemporary Philosophy, Religion and Theology [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003]). Mi-
chael V. Fox’s 1999-commentary on the book contains an insightful discussion of 
Qohelet’s treatment of the notion of “proper time,” see especially pp. 198-200. (M.V. 
Fox: A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build up: a Re-Reading of Ecclesiastes 
[Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 1999]). 
